This paper describes and discusses a method for collecting data relating to the potential for illness or injury to occur in an organization. The reason for using the term 'grey' is explained and the underpinning philosophy of fuzzy thinking is also discussed. The method used was an audit which attempted to measure the degree to which certain types of failure were present in one organization. The audit used a team approach in design and execution and was found to be a useful and useable tool for collecting information relating potential causes of injury or illness.
INTRODUCTION
A study carried out by Falconer and Hoel 1 showed that in one organization there was a tendency for line and senior managers to cite operator error as the major contributory factor in accident causation. This tendency appeared to be conditioned, in part, by the information the managers received from within the organization. This information tended to be in the form of either low grade injury reports or reports of achievement against targets for a reduction in numbers of lost time injuries. Both these measures were based on quantitative, historical data which looked backward from the present. Little information was provided which related to potential failures in the organization or its control systems, i.e. looking forward to predict where problems might occur in the future. The managers' understanding of occupational health issues, as opposed to occupational injury, was minimal and they were largely unable to cite any causative mechanisms for occupational illness. Falconer and Hoel therefore suggested the trial of a safety and health audit system, which addresses organizational issues as one way of providing information which concentrates upon potential sources of failure. The authors proposed that this type of information may improve the understanding of managers and therefore inform decisions more effectively than historical, quantitative data. This paper describes the trial of an audit system which required managers to ask different questions than they had been asking up to that point. These questions did not relate to how many incidents of injury or illness the organization had suffered, but rather how well the control systems were working. Whilst the use of occupational safety and health (OSH) audit systems in industry is not new, 2 the system described here is influenced by a philosophy which has not been extended to OSH management in the UK as yet, namely, fuzzy logic. Whilst the mechanics of the system described here may be familiar there are differences in the philosophy behind it and the use to which the resulting data is put which the authors believe will be of interest to occupational health practitioners. This paper briefly discusses the thinking behind fuzzy logic and why it appears applicable to OSH issues. It then goes on to explain the use of the adjective 'grey' to describe the data collected by the audit process and then to describe the method used to construct and test the audit. Finally the findings of a first test and their relevance to occupational health practice are discussed.
'Active failures' are those which immediately precede an incident and result either from errors committed by operators of equipment or systems, or excessive demands placed upon operators by a work system. 'Latent failures' are those which result from decisions, usually taken by senior and line managers, which are remote from the time and place of an incident. Latent failures create an environment which encourages active failures and which is intolerant of the results of error or incapacity. Reason argues that this classification of active and latent failures leads to a number of conclusions, including:
• The higher a person's position within the decisionmaking structure of an organization, the greater their potential for creating latent failures.
• The likelihood of an accident occurring is a function of the number of latent failures in an organization's work system. The more there are, the more likely an accident is to occur.
• As latent failures create the environment which both encourages the commission of active failures and is intolerant of their consequences, attempting to control latent failures is likely to have more safety and health benefits than concentrating on reducing active failures directly.
It is very likely that latent failures have as much influence in the causation of occupational illness as they do in injury causation. An understanding of the factors which may influence decisions is therefore of fundamental importance in controlling occupational risks and in the successful practice of occupational health.
The traditional view of how to make 'correct' business decisions is largely based in a rational approach. Fox 4 states that 'The basic assumption of classical decision theory is that it deals with rational choice'. Fox and Heracleous, 5 amongst many others, argue that this assumption renders the rational approach unrealistic and unhelpful in the real world. The rational approach requires that the decision makers have a clear and unambiguous understanding of the nature of the problem, that they carry out a comprehensive search for alternative courses of action, that each alternative is objectively evaluated and that they monitor the consequences of any chosen action. In reality these conditions are almost never met when making decisions in organizations. In many cases work systems are 'complex, dynamic, opaque and uncertain' 6 and as such do not lend themselves to an approach which requires more static and certain information.
A particular problem with this list of prerequisites for a rational decision is its presupposition that objectivity is possible, whatever the circumstances. In reality, true objectivity is hardly ever achievable. All players in the OSH decision-making process, for instance, will have their own perspectives be they managers, safety and health professionals or members of the workforce. 7 All will be conditioned by their own goals and constraints and by the tolerability of feasible alternatives. No one person's view can be said to be truly 'objective'. Quantitative incident data are also liable to subjectivity in recording, collection and analysis. It may seem strange to suggest that quantitative data may be subjective. However, in reality they are influenced by, for example, variations in definition. What one organization defines as a work related illness, for example, may not be the same as another. Indeed, in the field of occupational health some organizations spend a great deal of time and effort in agreeing definitions of work-relatedness. These definitions can also change over time, making identification of trends more difficult.
Traditionally subjectivity has been perceived as a problem. But why should this be so? If we accept that no one person can distance him/herself from the human condition sufficiently to have a truly objective viewpoint, we must also accept that decision-making processes must take account of human judgment. It seems, then, that the rational business decision may be unattainable, even if it were desirable. Heracleous 5 points to the mythical status of the apparently rational decision, arguing that 'the rational model's prescriptions of the identification of alternatives and the selection and implementation of a chosen course of action in a neat, sequential fashion do not describe what is in practice a much fuzzier process'.
Developments in the relatively new branch of mathematics termed fuzzy logic offer some promising insights into human decision-making. It is the underpinning philosophy rather than the mathematics itself which is of interest here. Fuzzy logic has grown from a realization of the limitations of traditional mathematics to provide information about the behaviour of complex systems. 8 Its essential tenet is that systems do not exist in black and white, true or false, states. Most things are matters of degree. Humans intuitively recognize the shades of grey inherent in the way the world works -most of our day to day existence is concerned with driving 'a bit faster' or buying 'around half a pound of cheese', for example. Fuzzy logic attempts to model the way we perceive the world by using linguistic variables such as 'a bit' or 'fairly' as inputs. These are then translated into ranges of values, rather than searching for precise numbers to express uncertainty. The contextual richness of language can be lost in the process of translation into traditional mathematical quantification and the ideas and concepts embodied in the language can be sterilized by the process. In the attempt to make information more amenable to traditional mathematical techniques we can fall into a taxonomy trap. Things must be defined as being one thing or another, true or false. However, in reality most things are not absolute; people are sometimes a bit tired or very tired, systems often work to some extent. Kosko 9 in Fuzzy Thinking quotes Einstein to illuminate this point: 'So far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain. And so far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality'.
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The most frequent applications of fuzzy logic so far have been in expert systems which control electronic systems. It has been highly successful in applications as diverse as washing machines and underground rail networks. More recently fuzzy logic specialists have begun to build models which may aid business decisionmaking. Fuzzy logic is therefore beginning to make the return journey from mathematics to human decisionmaking. An example of this is the Fuzzy Decision Maker™ described by McNeill and Thro, 10 who comment 'Unlike the fuzzy expert system, fuzzy decision making is just starting to be used in the real world'.
There are parallels to the fuzzy world picture in the realm of occupational safety. Reason" has proposed, for instance, that an organization can be seen as occupying a particular position on a continuum moving from 'safe' to 'unsafe'. This continuum is termed the 'safety space'. The authors of this paper have extended this term to take account of health issues on the basis of the similarities in organizational causation mechanisms of both injuries and illnesses. 12 There are certain factors which, Reason argues, influence an organization's position in the safety space. These are commitment, competence and cognisance. The latter refers to the knowledge and understanding an organization has of its own performance in OSH issues, i.e. the potential for injury or illness to occur (see Figure 1 ). It appears that organizations move forward and backward along the continuum in response to changes in the influencing factors. It is likely that an organization could never achieve total safety or healthiness and likewise, the notion of an organization being totally unsafe or unhealthy is not tenable. How could these extreme (black and white) ends of the continuum be defined? The navigational aids which help an organization to move in the direction of the 'safe/healthy' state include information relating to the condition of its safety and health systems. The audit carried out in this study attempted to provide information on the state of systems which affect safety and health by measuring the degree to which certain types of failure were Likely to be present in the organization i.e. the shades of grey between 'true' (white) and 'false' (black). Hence the use of the term 'grey' by the authors to describe the data collected.
METHOD Outline
The test of the audit was carried out with a large UK manufacturing company. The audit system concentrated upon the areas where latent failures may occur in the organization's work systems. It had two main aims. Firstly, to deliver valuable information to the organization relating to potential causes of injury and ill-health and, secondly, for the researchers to test a method for the collection of grey data. This paper is concerned primarily with the second aim, i.e. a description and discussion of the methodological aspect of the study.
The audit was planned to take the form of a series of statements in the following categories:Hardware defects; Inappropriate design; Poor maintenance management; Poor operating procedures; Error enforcing conditions; Poor housekeeping; Incompatible goals; Communication failures; Inadequate training; Inadequate defences and Organizational failure. These categories are known as 'general failure types' (GFTs). GFTs have been offered by Reason, Groeneweg, et al. 13 as one classification of likely types of failure which may lead to injury or illness. It is likely that increasing presence of these failure types corresponds to increasing risk of injury or illness. The audit therefore attempted to measure the degree to which certain GFTs were present in the organization. 
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An organisation's place on the continuum relates to the potentiaJ for injury or illness to occur, e.g. in this case the potential in company A in 1994 was greater than that in 1996. It is important to note that it is the relative place on the continuum over time which is most important, i.e. the direction the organisation is moving.
Design of the audit system
At site level. It was clear to the authors that an important element of testing a grey data gathering system would be the participation of all the parties to be involved at all stages of the system's development.
There are two major reasons for this. Firstly a system which appeared to be imposed would be less likely to succeed than one in which all participants had a stake. Secondly, it is self-evident that considerable expertise and experience of how work systems impinge upon OSH rests both with those who control the systems and those who are controlled by them." Managers' and workers' knowledge must therefore be the foundation of an audit such as this. In fact, the word audit was not used to describe this system as it seemed to elicit a rather negative response from several members of the organization who considered they were suffering from 'audit fatigue'. Even though the system is an audit, it was referred to as a review and this proved much more acceptable.
The audit was carried out at two of the company's sites. One was a heavy engineering site, the other handled hazardous chemicals, the activities at these two sites being representative of a significant proportion of the activities of the company. As a first step one steering group was formed at each site. The steering groups consisted of the site operations director, a representative from the site safety department, two representatives from site line management and two representatives from the workforce. Time and manpower restrictions did not allow all 11 GFTs to be audited in all departments at each site. Therefore the remit of each steering group was to advise the authors of the four most relevant GFTs to be audited at the site, to nominate three departments and members of those departments to take part in the study and to keep an overall watching brief on its operation.
The four categories of GFT chosen were:
• At the engineering site: training, communication, hardware defects and incompatible goals.
• At the chemicals site: housekeeping, communication, maintenance and incompatible goals.
Both sites chose 'incompatible goals' as the fourth failure type, but as the study progressed it became clear that reviewing such a GFT directly would be difficult. The abstract nature of 'incompatible goals' made it difficult to define in isolation and to translate into measurable statements. However, it remains an important type of failure which should be addressed in an audit such as this. The authors came to the conclusion that it would be most effectively measured by statements in other GFT categories which might show up where there was a conflict of goals. This is discussed in more detail in the 'Findings' section of this paper At department level. Each nominated department at each site formed an audit group. The group consisted of the department manager, a representative at supervisory level and the department's safety representative. The functions of the audit groups were as follows:
• To discuss priority areas within the GFTs.
• To inform the authors of the safety and health related systems currently being used in the department. This was carried out during brainstorming sessions.
• To guide the audit system during its development
• To carry out the audit in mixed groups.
• To feed back their views to the authors on the operation of the audit.
The authors held a series of meetings with the audit groups which addressed the first three of the above issues. Comments upon the operation of these groups at each site are discussed in the 'Findings' section of this paper. In parallel with these meetings the authors designed the audit format and developed the statements to be tested.
Description of the audit system
The audit consisted of five statements to be evaluated under each GFT category, making 15 statements in all. The statements were designed to test the operation of work systems which may affect OSH. All statements were positively phrased and the audit team's task was to assign truth values to each of the 15 statements. The teams reached their decisions on truth values by carrying out a number of activities such as observation, checking documentation and talking to various members of the workforce. Each statement had a range of suggested activities for the teams, but these were designed to be neither prescriptive nor exhaustive. As an example, two of the maintenance statements are shown in Figure 2 , along with the suggested activities for the audit group. Initially the truth values were linguistic, e.g. poor, very poor, excellent and related to certain elements in a statement's evaluation (see Figure  3 ). The teams then decided on the overall linguistic description of the degree of truth of a statement and then on the numeric percentage values which approximated to that description. For example, at the engineering site, poor translated into numeric values between 10-25%. In this way the audit groups defined the range of values which approximated to a linguistic variable, although they did not have that task as an explicit objective.
Testing of the audit system
The audit itself was carried out by the members of the groups. Each department was audited by two of its own group members and one from another group. Both the authors and the group members were in favour of the mixing of groups for the audit, both to keep a watch on possible bias and to ask questions as someone unfamiliar with the department. The detailed organization of how the audit was carried out was left to the audit teams to decide, with some initial advisory input from the authors. All teams eventually chose a similar approach, i.e. the work was split to some extent between the team members to avoid duplication of 
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Thar* I* a workable and effective system for importing bnakdownMtoxtnortBnvy mmlnfntnc* needs". effort. The nondepartmental members of the teams either accompanied the other two members intermittently or, if his or her expertise were suitable, s/he carried out a part of the audit alone. Once the audit had been completed, the team regrouped to discuss their findings and agree upon the truth values for each statement. The results were then returned to the authors for analysis.
Analysis
The analysis consisted of the following stages.
• Summation of the truth values for each statement in each GFT classification and the calculation of an arithmetic mean for each GFT.
• Calculation of the maximum variance, or range, of the truth values in each GFT classification, i.e. the difference between the maximum and minimum.
• Plotting both mean and range on a single graph for each site.
Analysis was deliberately kept conventional as this study was not an exercise in mathematics, either conventional or fuzzy, but rather a test of a method to gather grey data. In this case an arithmetic mean was calculated to show the average of the truth values in each GFT category. As truth values in each set could differ by as much as 100% {i.e. one value of 0 and one value of 100%) the authors recognized that just the mean alone did not give sufficient information. A measure was needed of the range of truth values to show if the mean was being skewed, perhaps by one particularly high or low value. For instance, a mean of 76% may look reasonable, but if that mean were due to four values of 90% and oneof 20% then it is clearly important to show the range of 70%. The 20% truth value will indicate a fairly poor area which needs action. Conversely, a mean of 49% resulting from three of 45% and two of 55% will show a range of 20%: i.e. less variance and therefore the mean is more representative of the overall situation than in the first case. Further consideration by the authors suggests that, whilst the range is clearly important, calculating the arithmetic mean may not be a particularly relevant method of analysis. This is further discussed in the Discussion, Conclusion and Recommendations section of this paper. Once the authors had completed the analysis the results were presented to the brainstorming and steering groups jointly at each site. The groups gave feedback regarding their opinion of the operation of the audit system at those presentations.
FINDINGS
This discussion of the findings draws on two sources of data, viz. the findings of the audit itself and the participants' view of the process.
Review findings
The results of the analysis for two departments at each site are shown on the histograms, or 'profiles', in Figures 4 and 5 as examples. These profiles show two bars for each GFT, i.e. the mean and the range.
The findings of the audit showed some interesting variations, both between departments and between GFTs. In some cases both departments at a site were largely in agreement regarding the findings for particular GFTs. For instance 'communication' in both departments at the engineering site ( Figure 4 ) showed a tendency for relatively large ranges but midrange means which would suggest that performance in communication matters was patchy. 'Training' in both departments at the site showed relatively low ranges and high means which would tend to suggest an area that was quite successful. In contrast to the similarities between communication and training, 'hardware defects' showed considerable variation between the two departments at the site. Department 1 scored a mean of 44% with a range of 76% whereas department 2 scored a mean of 82% with a range of 25%. The reviewers in department 1 clearly found the standards of hardware and equipment patchy as demonstrated by the range of 76%. Figure 5 demonstrates a similar phenomenon at the chemical site: i.e. departments 1 and 2 show more similarity in the GFTs communication and maintenance than they do in housekeeping.
The tendency for some GFTs to show greater variation between departments than others may be a function of the departments diemselves. For instance, the GFT 'hardware defects' is liable to demonstrate variance between departments as the amount and complexity of equipment used by some departments will be greater than others. Likewise, housekeeping is more subject to departmental activities and resultant space and time pressures. It is not that the underlying organizational successes and failures are different, but that the opportunity for them to be demonstrated in some GFT classifications is greater in some departments than in others, due to the activities going on there. Training, communication and maintenance, for instance, are activities which tend to have a stronger organizational influence and may be expected to show greater similarities between departments. It is important to point out that this phenomenon illustrates how it is inappropriate to use the results of an audit such as this in a comparative manner between departments in the same organization. Clearly some conclusions can be drawn from the audit regarding departmental performance, but the real strength in this auditing system lies in giving an overall picture of the position of the whole organization on the OSH continuum.
As discussed earlier, once the findings had been presented in this way the authors reviewed the analysis. It became apparent that there were potential problems in using an arithmetic mean. One of the major problems is the tendency for an arithmetic mean to settle around a mid point with increasing numbers of variables, i.e. the variation gets lost in the mean. In the case studied here there were only five statements to be analyzed in each GFT category, but the number of statements could be increased in some organizations, depending upon the circumstances of use. Calculating the range and expressing that alongside the mean helps to overcome this problem somewhat, but still the richness of the data is not reflected in the analyzed output. A more meaningful and rich method of presenting the results, which still uses the benefits of profiling, is simply plotting each truth value on a bar. This immediately gives a recognizable result, showing where the more dense grouping occurs and how great the variation is. With larger numbers of truth values a dark and light shading will become apparent, corresponding to a grey scale. An example is shown in Figure 6 .
Once results are presented in this way it is a logical next step to replace the numeric scale with a linguistic one. Variables such as good, very good or very poor may be used. For organizations more used to expressing results such as these in numeric terms it may be too great a leap to go directly to the use of linguistic variables alone. Initially it may be more acceptable to use numeric variables and let the use of linguistics evolve at a pace which suits the organization.
As well as recording a score for die degree of truth of a statement, the auditors were encouraged to make comments on the forms. These comments were intended both as aides memoire for group discussion regarding final scores and also to inform anyone looking at the results of the audit of details regarding action which may be required. Some examples of comments in the review of the maintenance GFT are reproduced in Figure 3 .
Perceptions of participants
The comments from those who carried out the audit can largely be divided into three groups as follows.
/. Time consumption factors. Generally the participants found the audit to be more time-consuming than initially anticipated. Three main reasons were identified. Firstly there appeared to be a need for group interpretation of the exact meaning of several of the statements before the audit could start. Secondly, when approaching people (managers and employees) direcdy as demanded by the nature of statements, the consumption of time was difficult to regulate as those approached were frequendy eager to discuss issues raised on the spot. Thirdly, writing up the findings of the audit teams appeared to be particularly timeconsuming. In order to address these problems, questions and guidelines could be sharpened and better focused. It was also suggested that introducing 'multiple choice' as an assessment method for some of the statements may significandy reduce the time necessary to undertake the audit.
Applicability of statements and guidelines.
The audit groups found the statements generally to be relevant and revealing. Some of the statements were felt to be too general and therefore difficult to evaluate. Whilst rephrasing and clarification may solve die problem of being too general, some of the teams suggested that breaking statements into smaller parts, or substatements, may make evaluation rather easier. The concerns the teams had initially voiced regarding possible difficulties in coming to a consensus truth value were not realized. All the teams felt that they had not been uncomfortable witii the subjectivity involved in the evaluation and were happy that die linguistic values and their corresponding scores were a fair reflection of the state of the systems being checked.
3. Process of the audit. On this point the feedback was very positive. In particular, the fact that the audit required the team members to question and involve members of the workforce directly was felt to be a particular strength. Several team members underlined that die audit was not 'just anodier exercise' and that it was a useful learning process. As one member suggested: '. . . die way die questions were framed made us look at systems and potential problems in new ways'. The team members felt the audit might usefully be incorporated in otiier similar activities such as environmental or quality audits which may help to alleviate some of die time pressures referred to above. Future research could investigate the applicability of grey data gathering to these others areas of organizational management.
DISCUSSION
It is clear that using retrospective data to measure an organization's OSH performance has severe limitations. The major drawback is that this method of measurement' does not give those in control much information regarding the potential for future illnesses or injuries. This study showed that it is possible to collect meaningful data on the potential sources of injury and illness witiiin organizations, even in difficult areas such as incompatible goals witiiin die organization. This phrase 'incompatible goals' refers to the fact that sometimes the goals organizations set themselves relating to OSH performance are incompatible with the way in which goals relating to, say, increased productivity are achieved. It is important to stress that this is not wholly inevitable. Improvements in the health of the workforce and productivity are not mutually exclusive. However, where such incompatibilities do exist they are not easily identified formally. This situation is very much a case where die knowledge of the workforce is a fundamental source of information. However, asking questions which direcdy relate to incompatible goals is very difficult in isolation. 'There are incompatible goals in this department' is much too broad a statement to be assessed effectively. During the brainstorming sessions it became clear that issues relating to incompatible goals may surface in relation to the other GFTs. It therefore became apparent that measuring the degree to which this GFT is present is rather like trying to see a faint light in the dark -it becomes clearer if you do not look straight at it. For example, the first statement in Figure  3 'sufficient time is allowed in production schedules to facilitate maintenance procedures' elicited comments relating to incompatible goals in relation to OSH and maintenance procedures. It may be that other GFTs such as 'organizational failure' are also most effectively assessed in this way.
Information on the state of an organization's systems is a prerequisite of any organizational learning process with a change of mindset as its longterm objective. Presenting decision makers with examples of how previously made decisions may have unforeseen implications and directly increase the potential for future injuries or ill health is essential. In this case an example would be the decision, formal or informal, to discontinue preventive maintenance without allowing for necessary slack in the system for breakdown maintenance to be the norm. Similarly the housekeeping problems created by lack of space may be an unforeseen outcome of previous reorganizations. Whilst such negative implications may seem obvious with hindsight they may be difficult to foresee without the kind of information provided by an activity such as this audit. It is also hoped that new insight into the potential impact of latent failures may facilitate a shift away from preoccupation with operator errors and lost-time injuries, to a new role in which identification of such failures, which may affect both health and safety, takes priority.
The relevance of the audit technique described here to occupational health practice is manifold. The examples here may seem to concentrate more upon traditional 'safety' questions than those that relate to health. However, the causation mechanisms for occupational illness are the same as those for occupational injury, i.e. a failure by the organization to control occupational risks. As such it is equally important to have cognisance of the state of the organizations' systems in controlling health risks as when attempting to control injuries. The authors are very much of the opinion that an audit such as the one described here should comprise both traditional 'safety' areas and traditional 'health' areas. There is little point in two separate activities being carried out which amount to the same thing. In many ways the distinction between injury and illness is only one of onset time in any case -injuries tend to be in the here and now, illnesses tend to be in the maybe future. Predisposition is recognized as being a factor in the tendency for some people to contract diseases whilst others who are exposed to the same risk factors remain unaffected. In a similar way predisposition can affect the likelihood of being injured. For example, differences in reaction time, sensory perception and state of health and fitness can make some people more likely to be involved in accidents than others. The fundamental cause of injury and illness lies in the way the organization designs and controls its work systems. If those systems do not encourage error, do tolerate it when it occurs and take account of the capabilities of the workforce then the likelihood of either injury or illness occurring is considerably reduced.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The authors previously found 1 that the managers in the participating organization tended to cite operator error as the major cause of injuries and displayed little recognition of occupational health issues. The authors now propose that using an audit technique such as the one described here will increase understanding of occupational risks by making those carrying it out ask questions which they may not otherwise ask. These questions relate to how the organization is operating as opposed to how many incidents there have been during a previous time period. Retrospective data can act as trend identifiers over a prolonged time period but are limited in the information they can impart regarding potential for future incidents. 14 These data do have a place in performance measurement, as indeed do other forms of quantification such as formal, quantified risk assessment. However, the role of more qualitative measures has not been sufficiently great in the past and the balance between the two needs to move more in favour of qualitative measures. A primary performance measurement tool has to be prospective data which can be more effectively used to predict likely sources of injury or illness.
The audit system tested here used a consensus of the people who are affected by work systems to measure the degree to which those systems may fail in particular ways. Its most important constituent elements were the involvement of the workforce in designing and carrying out the audit and the philosophy of measurement which underpinned the design and analysis of results. There is need for much future research in the area of grey data collection and particularly in the use of such data in decision-making processes within organizations.
